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Millions of workers serve under contracts which express nothing
about the right of either employee or employer to leave the em-
ployment relationship. For many years, the doctrine of "employ-
ment-at-will" permitted an employer to discharge any employee at
his pleasure. In 1980, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the
California Supreme Court held that a discharge in violation of
public policy is a tort.' Since then, an explosion in wrongful dis-
charge tort litigation has occurred.
Several courts of appeal subsequently recognized a second
wrongful discharge tort. These courts held that a termination is
tortious where the employer has breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which inheres in every contract.2 On De-
cember 29, 1988, in a landmark decision, Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.,a the California Supreme Court held that a tort action
is not available when the employer discharges an employee in bad
faith.
This article places wrongful discharge tort law within a larger
context. Many distinguished legal commentators have criticized
what they call the "formal" style of legal reasoning. These com-
mentators have recognized an alternative style of legal reasoning:
instrumentalism. This article examines the influence of formal and
instrumental thinking on wrongful discharge tort cases in
California.
* Member, California Bar, J.D. Harvard Law School, 1982. The author practices ed-
ucation and employment law.
1. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
2. In this article, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is referred to as "the
covenant." A breach of the covenant is referred to as "bad faith."
3. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). In
Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 89 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6755 (May 25, 1989), the
court held that the Foley decision applied retroactively to all cases pending on January 30,
1989.
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I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The doctrine of employment-at-will holds that where the parties
do not expressly agree to the contrary, either the employer or the
employee may terminate the contract at any time.' California en-
acted an at-will statute in 1872, and the rule remained firmly en-
trenched for almost a century.5 The only significant judicially-cre-
ated exception to the rule came in 1959, when an appellate court
held that an employee's discharge may not violate considerations
of public policy.6
In 1980 and 1981, a trilogy of decisions transformed wrongful
discharge law in California. First, the California Supreme Court
held that a cause of action sounding in tort lies whenever an em-
ployee is terminated in violation of public policy.' Justice Tobri-
ner, writing for the majority in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
also suggested that, in certain instances, a dismissal might be a
tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9
Several months later in Cleary v. American Airlines, a court of
appeal followed Tobriner's suggestion and allowed a discharged
employee to state a bad faith cause of action for breach of the
covenant. 10 Finally, in Pugh v. See's Candies, another court of ap-
peal held that the presumption of employment-at-will may be
overcome to prove a breach of contract." Under Pugh, an implied
contractual promise to dismiss only for good cause may be proven
by the plaintiff. The implied promise is identified by examining
the totality of the relationship between the parties."
4. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Industrial Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1416-19 (1967); Feinman, The
Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 ANt. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-28 (1980).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51999.9 (1872). The statute provided: "An employment hav-
ing no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party, on notice to the other,
except where otherwise provided by this title." The statute now appears at CAL LAB. CODE
§ 2922 (West 1971). Swaffield v. Universal Esco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1969); Wilson v. Red Bluff Daily News, 237 Cal. App. 2d 87, 46 Cal. Rptr. 591
(1965); Lynch v. Gagnon, 96 Cal. App. 512, 274 P. 584 (1929).
6. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
7. Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations On The Right To Discharge: A
California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. Rav. 65 (1982).
8. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1980).
9. Id. at 179, n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
10. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
11. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1980)
("Pugh I"). In Pugh, the employer summarily discharged an at-will employee after he
criticized the company's new collective bargaining agreement as a "sweetheart contract."
During his 32 years with the company, the employee had risen from dishwasher to vice
president in charge of production. There had been no written criticism of his work.
12. Id. at 326-27, 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. 925-28. On retrial, the jury returned a
2
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Since 1980, wrongful discharge lawsuits have proliferated in
California.'" Preventive measures by legal counsel to minimize
employers' liability has led to the emergence of what one frus-
trated judge has termed "the disemployment industry." 4 Many
terminated employees have won substantial damage awards from
sympathetic juries.' 5 Numerous appellate decisions have sought to
clarify the tort duties imposed on employers.' 6 Most recently, in
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., the California Supreme Court de-
clared that an employer's breach of the implied covenant is not a
general verdict for the employer. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 250
Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988).
13. Sacramento Daily Recorder, July 19, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (reporting estimate by
Stanford labor law professor William B. Gould IV, that one wrongful termination is filed in
the California courts each day). Other commentators have estimated that, throughout the
nation, several hundred thousand American employees are wrongfully terminated each
year. Peck, Book Review, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 263, 264 (1986).
14. Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div., 638 F. Supp. 726, 735 (C.C.D. Cal. 1986).
15. A survey of California trials during the period 1979-87 illustrates the economic
impact of the new tort. For public policy cases, the median award to employees has been
$265,000, while the average award was $512,000. When cases won by employers are in-
cluded, the average award to employees was still $280,000. For bad faith cases, the median
award to ,employees was $142,000 and the average award was $540,000. When bad faith
cases won by employers are included, the average award to employees was $314,000. The
awards for contract cases were much lower: $60,000 (median), $127,000 (average),
$78,000 (including cases won by employers). Jung & Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful
Discharge, Los Angeles Daily Journal Report, Nov. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1. This article
summarizes a study by the Rand Corporation.
16. The California Supreme Court has granted petitions for review in 11 pending
wrongful discharge cases. The cases are: Welch v. Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co.
(S.008779, hg. granted March 2, 1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 164, 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (appro-
priate measure of damages in a wrongful discharge action based on breach of an employ-
ment contract; allegation that employer is liable in tort for conspiring to induce breach of
employment contract); Chapman v. Research Industries, Inc. (S.003669, hg. granted Feb.
25, 1988) (allegation that employer breached implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing); Movie Company Enterprises v. V.S.C. Enterprises, Inc. (SO03414, hg. granted Feb.
25, 1988) (allegation that federal labor law preempts common law action for breach of the
covenant); LaGoe v. Duber Industrial Security, Inc. (9000735, hg. granted Nov. 2, 1987),
194 Cal. App. 3d 349, 239 Cal. Rptr. 445 (allegation that wrongful discharge claim is
defeated when employer has good faith belief that there is good cause to terminate); Cono-
ver v. Oracle Corporation (S001064, hg. granted July 16, 1987) (allegation that employer
negligently misrepresented job opportunity to job applicant who was later terminated);
Koire v. City of Los Angeles (S000735, hg. granted June 25, 1987) (allegation that denial
of a promotion breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Litwack v. Fedmart
Corporation (S000241, hg. granted May 14, 1987) (allegation that there is no breach of
the covenant when the employer acts in good faith, based on probable cause); Ketchu v.
Sears Roebuck and Company (S.F.25119, hg. granted Feb. 5, 1987) (allegation that
wrongful discharge claim is defeated when employer has good faith, albeit mistaken, belief
that there is cause to terminate); Newman v. Guardian Title Company (LA.32263, hg.
granted Oct. 30, 1986) (appropriate measure of damages in a wrongful discharge action);
Miller v. Indasco, Inc. (L.A.32204, hg. granted June 20, 1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 296, 223
Cal. Rptr. 551 (allegation that wrongful discharge action is barred by statute of limita-
tions); Santa Maria Hospital v. Superior Court (L.A.32143, hg. granted Jan. 16, 1989)
172 Cal. App. 3d 698, 218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (allegation of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
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The Foley decision, while seminal, nonetheless left many impor-
tant issues unresolved. The definition of public policy must be de-
cided in future cases.18 The full range of possible contractual
damages for a wrongful discharge has yet to be fully explored.19
The court must also determine the appropriate statute of limita-
tions to apply to wrongful discharge contract actions, 0 and has
yet to consider other, collateral tort actions arising out of employ-
ment termination .2  Finally, in response to language in Foley em-
phasizing that the future of employment-at-will is a matter best
left to the Legislature, several bills have been introduced in that
body. These legislative proposals would significantly alter the law
of employment termination in California. 2
II. STYLES OF LEGAL REASONING
Legal historians and theorists have identified two influential,
and contradictory, styles of legal reasoning. One style is univer-
sally known as formalism. The other style has been variously iden-
tified as sociological jurisprudence, realism, the Grand Style, pur-
posive reasoning, or instrumentalism. In this article, the second
style is referred to as instrumentalism. Both styles of reasoning
are represented in the debate in the courts over the public policy
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will.
17. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
18. Id. at 669, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217 ("We do not decide in this case whether a tort
action alleging a breach of public policy under Tameny may be based only on policies
derived from a statute or constitutional provision or whether nonlegislative sources may
provide the basis for the claim").
19. For a discussion of the damages issues in breach of contract cases, see Traynor,
Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the Seaman's Case, 8 Bus.
L. NEws 1, 12-13 (1984) (advocating contract-based compensatory damages as an alterna-
tive to tort damages); Mandelbaum, Wrongful Discharge Cases After 'Foley'. More So-
phisticated Approach to Contract Damages Expected, Los Angeles Daily Journal Report,
May 19, 1989, at 8, 9.
20. There is a two-year statute of limitations for breaches of oral contracts. CAL
CIv. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982).
21. Other tort actions might include defamation, interference with contractual rela-
tions, and infliction of emotional distress (both negligent and intentional).
22. Capitol Reacts to Foley With Flurry of Bills, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jan.
20, 1989, at 1, col. 6. The bills which have been introduced by legislators are: Sen. Bill No.
282 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) (employee may be discharged only for "just cause"; employee
may contest his dismissal in mandatory binding arbitration); Sen. Bill. No. 222 (1989-1990
Reg. Sess.) (employer cannot terminate, absent a legitimate business reason, if employee
has served specified period and earns specified minimum salary); Sen. Bill No. 181 (1989-
1990 Reg. Sess.) (employee may bring tort action if employer breaches the implied cove-
nant; legislatively overrules the Foley decision); Sen. Bill No. 115 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.)
(prohibits employer from requiring employee to sign express at-will termination clause).
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A. Formalism and Instrumentalism
A concise statement of the distinction between formalism and
instrumentalism23 has been offered by Roberto Mangabeira Un-
ger.24 Unger stated that "[1]egal reasoning is formalistic when the
mere invocation of rules and the deduction of conclusions from
them is believed sufficient for every legal choice. ' 25 Unger also
identified an alternative style, purposive reasoning, which can be
equated with instrumentalism. Legal reasoning is instrumental
"when the decision about how to apply a rule depends on a judg-
ment of how most effectively to achieve the purposes ascribed to
the rule."26
In the United States, formalism has often been associated with
doctrines invoking a dichotomy between public and private activ-
ity.27 The two activities were perceived as radically distinct. In the
private sphere, governmental regulation was illegitimate. In the
other sphere-the public sphere-governmental intrusion was ap-
propriate. Courts were charged with the task of identifying the
boundaries between the public and private spheres of activity. The
fusion of formalism with the concept of the public-private dichot-
omy has been identified by some theorists as the "classical" style
23. Influential discussions of the formal-instrumental dichotomy include: M. HOR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); K. LLEWELLYN. THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form
and Substance]; Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judi-
cial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
24. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THE-
ORY 194-216 (1976).
25. Id. at 194. See also P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
388 (1979). Atiyah states:
Formalism really represents an attitude of mind rather than anything else; the
attitude is that of the judge who believes that all law is based on legal doctrine
and principles which can be deducted from precedents; that there is only one 'cor-
rect' way of deciding a case; that it is not the function of the judge to invoke
policy considerations, or even arguments about the relative justice of the parties'
claims; that the reasons behind principles and rules are irrelevant; that the role of
the judge is purely passive and interpretive; that law is a science of principles, and
so on.
Id. A classic illustration of the formalist mentality appears in Justice Owen Roberts' opin-
ion in U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62, 56 S. Ct. 312, 318 (1936). Roberts stated that the
judge has "only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to determine whether the latter squares with the former."
One historian has called this the "slot machine theory of constitutional interpretation." A.
SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 458 (1960).
26. R. UNGER, supra note 24, at 194, n.24.
27. E. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 23-29 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance, supra note 23, at 1728-40; Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RE-
SEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (1980).
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of legal thought." In this article, references to formalism also re-
fer to the classical style.
A key element in academic legal thought during the past cen-
tury has been a "revolt against formalism."29 It is often said that
formalism dominated judicial opinion writing during the late nine-
teenth century.30 As successive waves of critics attacked formal-
ism, the other style of legal reasoning, instrumentalism, emerged
as the anti-formal alternative. 31
Two of the earliest participants in the revolt against formalism
were Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Roscoe Pound. By 1905, in
a celebrated series of articles and opinions, Holmes had staked out
his position: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."32
He urged that judges should take into account such considerations
as history, social context, and the functional purposes of legal
rules.3 3 Pound, the long-time dean of the Harvard Law School,
adopted a similar approach, which he called "sociological juris-
prudence. '3 4 By 1908, Pound had attacked "mechanical jurispru-
dence" and had stated that legal principles should be studied to
evaluate "their social operation and the effects which they
produce. 3 5
The full-scale assault on formalism came with the advent of re-
alism, in the 1920s and 1930s.*36 The realists were (primarily) a
28. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 23, at 1724-40; E. MENSCH, supra
note 27, at 23-29.
29. The phrase was coined by the intellectual historian Morton White. M. WHrTE,
THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949). White referred to general developments in the
history of American ideas. See also E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1975); W. TWINING, KARL LLEW-
ELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 3-83 (1973); Mensch, supra note 23, 26-29; White,
From Sociological Jurisprudence to Legal Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); Note, 'Round and 'Round
the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1669 (1982).
30. M. HORWITZ, supra note 23; Nelson, supra note 23; Contra, Scheiber, Instru-
mentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Rea-
soning" in the 19th Century, Wis. L. REV. 1, 8 (1975) ("If the picture was thus a mixed
one in the 1820-50 period-with 'instrumentalist' judges often invoking formalistic doc-
trine, and doctrinaire critics adducing instrumental arguments-it was also so in the late
nineteenth century").
31. W. TWINING, supra note 29, at 3-83.
32. Lochner v. New York, 193 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S. Ct. 349 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
33. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV L. REV. 1 (1984); Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
34. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 389, 514 (1912).
35. Id. See also Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609
(1908) ("The sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a
philosophy of law.")
36. W. TWINING, supra note 29, at 375-87; Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra
[Vol. 26
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group of eastern law professors. The realists disagreed on many
things, but were united in their opposition to formalism. They de-
nied that abstract general principles could invariably be invoked
"logically" to decide specific cases. The realists emphasized the
importance of social context and the functional purposes served by
law. They vigorously disputed the classical belief that a meaning-
ful boundary can be drawn between public and private activity.
The realists also argued that judges, like legislators, make public
policy.
In 1960, two decades after the heyday of realism, a prominent
realist, Karl Llewellyn, published The Common Law Tradition, a
study of appellate judicial work.37 Llewellyn discussed the phe-
nomenon of judicial style:
It is the general and pervasive manner over the country at large,
at any given time, of going about the job, the general outlook,
the ways of professional knowhow, the kind of thing the men of
law are sensitive to and strive for, the tone and flavor of the
working and of the results. It is well described as a 'period-
style'; it corresponds to what we have long known as period-style
in architecture or the graphic arts or furniture or music or
drama. Its slowish movement but striking presence remind me
also of shifting 'types' of economy ('agricultural', 'industrial',
e.g.) and of the cycles or spirals many sociologists and historians
discover in the history of political aggregations or of whole
cultures.38
Llewellyn distinguished what he called the Formal Style from
the Grand Style. According to Llewellyn, the hallmarks of the
Grand Style are that:
'[P]recedent' is carefully regarded, but if it does not make sense
it is ordinarily re-explored; 'policy' is explicitly inquired into; al-
leged 'principle' must make for wisdom as well as for order if it
is to qualify as such, but when so qualified it acquires peculiar
status. On the side both of case-law and of statutes, where the
reason stops there stops the rule; and in working with statutes it
is the normal business of the court not only to read the statute
but also to implement that statute in accordance with purpose
and reason.39
The Formal Style is quite different:
The rules of law are to decide the cases; policy is for the legisla-
ture, not for the courts, and so is change even in pure common
note 23, at 1731-33; Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to
Critical Legal Scholarship, supra note 29, at 1670-76.
37. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23. For analysis of this book, see W. TWINING, supra
note 29, at 203-69.
38. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 36.
39. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 217
(1962), quoted in W. TWINING, supra note 29, at 210-11.
1989]
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law. Opinions run in deductive form with an air or expression of
single-line inevitability. 'Principle' is a generalization producing
order which can and should be used to prune away those 'anom-
alous' cases or rules which do not fit, such cases or rules having
no function except, in places where the supposed 'principle' does
not work well, to accomplish sense-but sense is no official con-
cern of a formal-style court.,"
In the 1970s, several historians examined the influence of in-
strumentalism and formalism. 41 Instrumentalism was defined as a
"self-conscious attempt to view law as a means toward the attain-
ment of some end."42 Formalism was depicted as "the notion that
social controversies could be resolved by deductions drawn from
first principles on which all men agreed. . . .-4 Some commenta-
tors argued that in the nineteenth century the predominant style
shifted from instrumentalism to formalism.44 In this century, in
the post-realist era, modern legal thought has been portrayed as a
continuing (and unsuccessful) effort to reconcile both formalism
and instrumentalism. 45
B. Stereotyped Arguments
Duncan Kennedy, in an influential article published in 1976,
analyzed the tensions between formal and substantive visions of
justice.46  Kennedy suggested that competing ideological visions
generate countervailing, stereotypical sets of policy arguments. He
argued that "the arguments are symmetrical, few in number, and
repeated endlessly in different legal contexts." 4 Legal reasoning,
40. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 38.
41. M. HORWITZ, supra note 23; Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265
(1978); Nelson, supra note 23.
42. Nelson, supra note 23, at 515.
43. Nelson, supra note 23, at 566.
44. M. HORWITZ, supra note 23; Nelson, supra note 23; Contra, Scheiber, supra
note 30.
45. Klare, supra note 41, at 335 ("The formalist and realist traditions are continued
sub silentio in judicial decisions, but in a manner consistent with legal vision.")
46. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 23. Kennedy identified two diametri-
cally opposed visions of substantive justice: altruism and individualism. Kennedy also dis-
tinguished between rules and standards. He concluded that there is a connection between
rules and individualism; that there is a similar linkage between standards and altruism; and
that "the individualist/formalist and the altruist/informalist operate from flatly contradic-
tory visions of the universe." Id. at 1776.
These insights, while extremely important, do not support the political arguments which
Professor Kennedy advanced in subsequent writings. Professor Kennedy is a co-founder of
the Critical Legal Studies movement. This movement is associated with a radical critique
of the legal system as an instrument of social oppression. The author of this article is not
associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement and does not share their ideological
views on the alleged desirability of redistributing wealth and power in American society.
47. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
[Vol. 26
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because of the fundamental contradictions between underlying
philosophies, often deteriorates into "the mechanical manipulation
of balanced, pro/con policy arguments that come in matched
pairs. '48 In the context of formalism and instrumentalism, the
tension between the styles generates three standard sets of bal-
anced pro/con policy arguments. The arguments arise when: (1) a
court must choose between rules and standards; (2) a court de-
cides whether it should be concerned with the social consequences
of a legal rule; and (3) a court considers the institutional compe-
tence of the judiciary to make public policy. These argu-
ments-rules vs. standards, social consequences, and institutional
competence-recur in many different doctrinal disputes cutting
across numerous branches of private law, including wrongful dis-
charge cases.
The issue of rules and standards turns on the specificity and
abstraction of the law.49 All legal requirements can be placed on a
continuum ranked according to the degrees of generality. Formal-
ists prefer rules, while instrumentalists prefer standards. A law
granting suffrage to any person over the age of 18 is an example
of a rule. A law granting suffrage to "mature" persons only is an
example of a standard. The virtue of a rule is that it promotes
certainty and restrains arbitrariness. The vice of a rule is that it
may be over- or under-inclusive and thereby incapable of achiev-
ing the purpose of the law (e.g., some persons over the age of 18
may not be mature voters). The advantages (and defects) of a
standard are asymmetrical to those of a rule. A standard may be
applied with a measure of discretion, so as to achieve the purpose
underlying the standard; the danger with standards, of course, is
that decision makers may enjoy too much latitude.
The issue of social consequences involves the court in an assess-
ment of its willingness to consider the functional purpose of legal
rules and the role of litigants as stand-ins for large social groups.
Formalism de-personalizes the parties, divorces them from social
context, and ignores social consequences. As Grant Gilmore ex-
plained in his critique of formalism in nineteenth century contract
law:
The status of the contracting parties and the subject matter of
their deal were no longer to be taken into account. The law,
under the new dispensation, no longer recognized factors or bro-
kers, farmers or workers, merchants or manufacturers, shipown-
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 581 (1982).
48. Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1982).
49. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 23, at 1687-1701.
1989]
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ers or railroads, husbands or wives, parents or children--only
faceless characters named A and B, whoever they might be and
whatever it might be they were trying to accomplish.50
Instrumentally-minded judges, on the other hand, are acutely
aware of social context and self-consciously shape the common
law to achieve various social purposes.5 1
Finally, the tension between formalism and instrumentalism
generates matching sets of balanced arguments in a constantly re-
curring debate over institutional competence.52 Formalists tire-
lessly argue that public policy is a matter best left to the Legisla-
ture. Judges should be confined to the limited, passive role of
interpreting and applying statutes. The great evil is "judicial legis-
lation." Instrumentalism, on the other hand, holds that judges
can, should, and do, make public policy."
Two caveats are in order. First, formalism and instrumentalism
are styles of reasoning, and not rigorous methodologies.5 Most
judges are rarely, if ever, explicitly formal or instrumental. Sec-
ond, the long, sustained attack on formalism has persuaded for-
mally-minded courts to inject limited elements of instrumentalism
into their opinions. It is not uncommon for an opinion to offer
both instrumental and formal arguments in support of a legal
conclusion. 5
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The public policy exception to the at-will rule holds that where
a discharge violates public policy, the employee may sue in tort.56
The courts have disagreed as to the correct definition of "public
policy." The debate over the sources of public policy illustrates the
continuing tension between formalism and instrumentalism.
50. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 46 (1977).
51. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
52. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 23, at 1751-60.
53. E.g., Cardozo, supra note 51, at 114 ("If you ask how he [the judge] is to know
when one interest outweighs another, T can only answer that he must get his knowledge
just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life
itself.... Each is indeed legislating within the limits of his competence.")
54. E.g., Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 Am. J. LEG. HISTORY 221,
255 (1980). ("So legal formalism must be approached more as a loosely bound structure of
legal thought rather than as a rigidly detailed system operated in mechanical fashion.")
55. E.g., Nelson, supra note 23, at 515, n.12. ("Almost any result can be justified in
almost any case by use of either style."); Klare, supra note 41.
56. For a survey of the public policy cases, see Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in
At Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
[Vol. 26
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A. Formal and Instrumental Analysis
The formal analysis of the public policy exception can be easily
sketched. The analysis suggests that a tort action lies only where
the discharge violates a statute explicitly prohibiting the dismissal.
To support this conclusion, a formally-minded judge would ad-
vance several stereotyped arguments: employer misconduct should
be defined by fixed, predictable rules, not elastic, open-ended stan-
dards; only a statute explicitly prohibiting a dismissal attains the
necessary degree of certainty and specificity; the firing of a single
employee has no general social ramifications, unless the Legisla-
ture has indicated otherwise. The first principle-the appropriate
definition of public policy-is a matter best left to the Legislature.
If courts attempt to define "public policy," they usurp the power
of the legislative branch.
The instrumental analysis is the mirror opposite of formalism.
It is well illustrated by observations in a student note in the
Harvard Law Review.57 The author asserts that no "bright line"
rule can be drawn, because of the incoherence of the public-pri-
vate dichotomy:
[A]ny particular line between 'private' and 'public interests' is
vulnerable to the argument that it should have been drawn else-
where. . . . The realms of public and private interest in employ-
ment overlap substantially. . . All dismissals without 'just
cause,' no matter how 'private' their motivation, undermine the
community's interest in economic productivity, stable employ-
ment and fairness in the workplace.58
The student author argued that lower- and lower-middle-class
workers are underrepresented by attorneys, and that there should
be a universal "just cause" standard governing termination.5 9
57. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1931 (1983).
58. Id. at 1948 (Cf. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 26 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 448, 459-60 (1985) ("The 'Achilles heel' of the public policy exception is
the imprecision inherent in the term 'public policy' "). Professor Mallor, after surveying
many jurisdictions, concluded: "The public policy cases can be viewed along a continuum.
Plaintiffs are likely to prevail when two factors are present: the public policy is clear, that
is, both specific and based on written law, and the discharge presents a clear threat of
frustrating that policy." Id. at 462. The analysis in Part II of this Article suggests that
formally-minded judges will identify a public policy only where it is "clear"; i.e., expressly
prohibited by statute.
For a brief but suggestive comment on "continuumization" as an attempt to reconcile
contradictory conceptions of justice, see Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public!
Private Distinction, supra note 48, at 1352-53. ("People who believe in continuua tend to
explain how they go about deciding what legal response is appropriate. . . by listing 'fac-
tors' that 'cut' one way or the other and must be balanced.")
59. Id. at 1933 ("The courts should recognize the public's interest in eliminating the
power of employers to discharge their employees without just cause").
1989]
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B. The California Cases
The courts in California initially recognized a public policy ex-
ception where the employer violated a statute expressly prohibit-
ing a dismissal. 0 In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the court expanded the potential scope of "public pol-
icy."'11 In Petermann, the employer gave the employee an impossi-
ble choice--commit the crime of perjury before a legislative inves-
tigative committee, or be fired. No statute expressly specified that
an employer could not fire a worker who refused to perjure him-
self. The Petermann court nonetheless recognized the employee's
cause of action and declared: "The right to discharge an employee
under an [at-will] contract may be limited by statute [citation] or
by considerations of public policy" [emphasis supplied].2 The
court then stated that the employee's discharge violated the state's
declared policy against perjury.63 After Petermann, the courts of
appeal held that there must be a statutory basis for an action
based on public policy. Three courts recognized actions based on
Labor Code Section 923, which permits employees to engage in
concerted activities.64 Other actions were disallowed where the
employee could not identify a statute.6 5
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the California Supreme
Court recognized the public policy exception and adopted the ex.-
pansive Petermann formulation of the employer's duty.68 Justice
Tobriner's majority opinion in Tameny was an exercise in the in-
strumental style. Tobriner adopted a standard, not a rule. 7 He
60. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946)
(statute prohibiting dismissal of employees for engaging in political activities); Kouff v.
Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949) (statute
prohibiting dismissal of employee for serving as election officer on election day).
61. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. at 18, 344 P.2d at
25.
62. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
63. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
64. CAL LAB. CODE 5923 (West 1971); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); Wetherton v. Growers' Farm Labor Assoc., 275 Cal. App. 2d 168,
79 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d
793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
65. Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1974); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
66. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d at 177-78, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845-
46. The employee alleged that he had been discharged because he refused to participate in
an illegal price-fixing scheme. The scheme would have violated federal and state antitrust
laws.
67. Id. at 174, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43. ("Petermann held that even in the absence
of an explicit statutory provision prohibiting the discharge of a worker . . . fundamental
principles of public policy and adherence to the objectives underlying the state's penal stat-
utes" requires that an employee may not be dismissed for violating a law.") Id.
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emphasized the social importance of protecting employees." He
also stated that the sources of public policy are not limited to leg-
islative enactments.6 9
The dissenting opinions, by contrast, resonated with the formal
style. Justice Manuel argued that the cause of action must arise
out of "a clear statutory source."70 He expressed a preference for
rules over standards when he stated: "I see no reason to search
further for [the source of public policy] among the vague and ill-
defined dictates of 'fundamental policy.' ",71 Justice Clark, in a
separate dissent, also followed the formal style. He complained
that "we again substitute our policy judgment for that of the leg-
islature. '7 12 Clark did not discuss the social consequences of the at-
will rule.7 3
After Tameny, the courts of appeal continued to disagree as to
the sources of public policy. Some courts limited the sources to
statutes.7 4 This judicial reluctance followed from the formal em-
phasis on institutional competence. Some courts might "mistake
their own predilections for public policy which deserves recogni-
tion at law."'7 5 Other courts endorsed the instrumental view.7 6 As
Justice Kaufman stated for the court of appeals in Koehrer v. Su-
perior Court: ". . . it is immaterial whether the public policy is
proclaimed by statute or delineated in a judicial decision." '7
68. Id. at 178, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
69. Id. ("The rights of employees have not only been proclaimed by a mass of legis-
lation . . . but the courts have likewise evolved certain additional protections at common
law.")
70. Id. at 179, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846, CAL. LAB. CODE 52856 (West 1971) provides,
in pertinent part, that "[a]n employee shall substantially comply with all directions of his
employer concerning the service on which he is engaged, except where such obedience is
impossible or unlawful."
71. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d at 179, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179-83, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846-48.
74. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 209 Cal. App. 3d 525, 538-40, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11-
12 (1988); Tyco Indus. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 157-59 (1985); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 476-78, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 617-18 (1984); Hentzel v.
Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 295-304, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161-68 (1982).
75. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. 3d at 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64 (1982).
76. Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Services, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1437-
45, 234 Cal. Rptr. 130-34 (1987) ("Fundamental policy may be expressed either by the
Legislature in a statute or by the courts in decisional law"); Koehrer v. Superior Court,
181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1163-67, 276 Cal. Rptr. 820, 825 (1986).
77. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 1165, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 825
(1986) (Kaufman, J.). Justice Kaufman was subsequently elevated to the California Su-
preme Court. His dissenting opinion in the Foley case is discussed in Part VII, infra.
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IV. THE SEAMAN'S CASE
In the Tameny decision, Justice Tobriner hinted in a footnote
that a wrongful discharge might be a bad faith tort.7 8 In a later
decision, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil,
the Supreme Court also suggested that there might be a wrongful
discharge tort.79 The Seaman's case strongly influenced the subse-
quent evolution of wrongful discharge tort law.80
A. The Covenant
The Seaman's decision was a landmark in a series of good faith
cases dating back to 1942. In Universal Sales v. California Press
Mfg., the supreme court held that, by operation of law, the cove-
nant is implied into every contract; it is nondisclaimable.81 The
nondisclaimable duty has been defined in broad, general terms.
The most commonly cited judicial definition of good faith is that
"[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing that neither party will do anything which injures the
right of the other to .receive the benefits of the agreement.",, 2
There are other, equally general formulations of the duty., The
duty to act in good faith was applied to many different types of
contractual relationships.84
78. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d at 179, fn.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
846.
79. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-70,
686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1984).
80. The Seaman's case arose out of the breach of a commercial contract. The Stan-
dard Oil Company agreed to supply oil to a marine fuel dealer. When market conditions
changed shortly thereafter, Standard refused to honor the agreement and claimed the con-
tract was not legally binding. At trial, the jury awarded punitive damages of $11,058,810
for breach of the implied covenant.
81. Universal Sales v. California Press Mfg., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665, 677
(1942).
82. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
83. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947) ("There is
an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract");
Colwell Co. v. Hubert, 248 Cal. App. 2d 567, 575, 56 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759 (1967) ("This
covenant not only imposes upon each contracting party the duty to refrain from doing
anything which would render performance of the contract impossible by an act of his own,
but also the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes that he will do to accom-
plish its purpose"). The Uniform Commercial Code defines "good faith" as "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (19). For merchants, the
Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. §§ 2-103 (1)(b).
"Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.
, .The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the
circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Sec. 205, comment a.
84. The cases are collected at Louderback and Jurike, Standards for Limiting the
[Vol. 26
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For many years, the victim of a breach of the covenant was
confined to contractual remedies. In 1967, in a landmark case, the
California Supreme Court recognized that an insurer's breach of
the covenant is a tort. 5 This rule was confirmed in a series of
insurance cases, which typically arose when the insurer denied
coverage or otherwise ignored the interests of the insured. 6 Vari-
ous forms of insurer misconduct were identified as torts.8
Subsequently, several courts suggested that misconduct by a
non-insurer might also be a tortious breach of the covenant. In
1978, in Sawyer v. Bank of America, a court of appeal stated:
"The tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing consists in bad faith action, extraneous to the contract,
with the motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment
of contract rights."8 8 In 1980, in Wagner v. Benson, the court sug-
gested that bad faith tort actions might not be limited to insur-
ance transactions. 9 Also in 1980, Justice Tobriner, in his Tameny
opinion, suggested in dictum that an unreasonable dismissal of an
employee might violate the covenant.9 0
In 1984, the California Supreme Court, in the Seaman's case,
expressly stated that not all breaches of the covenant are torts.9 1
Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 194-96, nn.31-40 (1982).
85. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967). In this opinion, the court emphasized the vulnerability of the insured: "Plaintiff did
not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect
herself against the risks of accidental losses, including the mental distress which might
follow from the losses." In Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663,
328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958), the court had stated that "wrongful refusal to settle has gener-
ally been treated as a tort."
86. The cases are collected in Miller & Estes, A California Trilogy, supra note 7, at
87-91.
87. E.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979) (failure to properly investigate the insured's claim); Neal v. Farmers' Ins. Ex-
change, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978) (failure to act on a timely basis after
the insured requested a prompt settlement); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (denial of benefits after wrongfully inducing the
injured to violate the terms of the policy); Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (insurer withheld disability benefits to save
money for the company); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 158
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (refusal to accept settlement offer within amount of policy).
88. Sawyer v. Bank of America NT&SA, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145 Cal. Rptr.
623, 625 (1978). In Sawyer, a bank inadvertently failed to pay an insurance premium on a
vehicle owned by the plaintiff. The bank then denied that it was liable. Given these facts,
the court of appeal refused to sustain an award of general and special damages, although it
did note the theoretical existence of the tortious breach of the covenant.
89. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980).
The court stated, "A bad faith cause of action sounding in tort has never been extended to
contractual relationships other than in the insurance field (citation). This does not mean
such claims arc limited only to insurance transactions." Id. at 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
90. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., at 179, n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
91. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc., v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769,
686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (1984).
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It also refused to state the opposite rule, that all breaches of the
covenant can never be tortious.92 Instead, the court invented a new
tort and offered an extremely provocative dictum describing em-
ployment as a special relationship.93
B. The New Tort
The Seaman's opinion holds that an independent tort action is
available "when, in addition to breaching the contract, [the de-
fendant] seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad
faith, and without probable cause, that the contract exists."9 '
There is no tort unless a breach of contract precedes the defend-
ant's deliberate disavowal of the very existence of the agree-
ment.9 5 The Seaman's tort is not a bad faith tort. Indeed, the su-
preme court, in a per curiam opinion, expressly noted that it did
not rely on the covenant to decide the case. 6
The new tort was more or less invented out of thin air. The
Seaman's court cited just two out-of-state cases.97 In Adams v.
Crater Welling Drilling, Inc., punitive damages were imposed to
punish a defendant who had threatened to file a frivolous law-
suit."8 The Adams case essentially involved the familiar tort of
abuse of process. In Jones v. Abriani, the court stated that puni-
tive damages may be available where the defendant fraudulently
induces an innocent party to enter into a consumer contract to
purchase a mobile home.9 9 Jones was, essentially, a fraud case.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 769, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court noted: "It is not even necessary to
predicate liability on a breach of the implied covenant." Id. A court of appeal subsequently
characterized the Seaman's decision as recognizing "a new intentional tort." Quigley v.
Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 890, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401 (1984).
94. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 91, at 769,
706 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In a concurring opinion in a case involving a claim under California law,
Judge Kozinski offered a harsh criticism of the Seaman's decision. Oki America, Inc. v.
Microtech International, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314-17 (9th Cir. 1989). Kozinski's-ritique
essentially rests on two formal arguments. First, he stated that the test for the Seaman's
tort is an unduly amorphous standard: "[i]t is impossible to draw a principled distinction
between a tortious denial of a contract's existence and a permissible denial of liability. .."
Id. at 315. Second, Judge Kozinski stated that the judicial branch is institutionally incom-
petent to make these determinations: "Courts are slow, clumsy, heavy-handed institutions,
ill-suited to oversee the negotiations between institutions." Id. at 316.
98. Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, Inc., 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976).
99. Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. 556, 350 N.E. 2d 645 (1976). The supreme court's
reference to this case was inappropriate. The court, in Seaman's, emphasized that the new
tort existed entirely apart from any special relationship which might exist between the
parties. Yet the Indiana court, in Abriani, was heavily influenced by the special relation-
ship concept: "It is hard to imagine where the public interest to be served is more impor-
tant than in consumer matters, especially when the consumer is in an inferior bargaining
16
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Neither of the cases involved "stonewalling" or a denial of the
existence of the contract.
Although the per curiam opinion in Seaman's was innovative, it
was not nearly so bold as the concurring and dissenting opinion
filed by then-Chief Justice Bird.100 Bird wrote that the nature of
the non-disclaimable duties imposed by the covenant depends on
"the expectations of the party and the purposes of the con-
tract."101 In some circumstances, Bird added, "the voluntary
breach of an acknowledged contract is itself a violation of the
duty to deal fairly and in good faith."10' 2
C. Employment As a Special Relationship
Although it was unwilling to extend the tort remedy to all bad
faith cases, the supreme court also refused to eliminate the bad
faith tort. Earlier, in 1979, the court had ruled that insurance is a
special relationship.103 In 1984, in the Seaman's case, the court
signaled its willingness to recognize at least one other special rela-
tionship, that of employment.10 4
The special relationship model is important for two reasons.
First, as a matter of black letter law, breaches of the covenant,
when there is a special relationship, are torts. Second, at a deeper,
more philosophical level, when a court recognizes a relationship as
"special," it reasons instrumentally.10 5
position and forced to sign an adhesive contract or do without the item desired." 350
N.E.2d at 650.
100. Seaman's Direct Buying Services v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d at 774-82,
206 Cal. Rptr. 366-71. Bird dissented from that part of the per curiam opinion which
stated that it was not necessary to predicate liability on a breach of the covenant.
101. Id. at 777, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
102. Id. at 781, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The broad scope of the "reasonable expecta-
tions" test is suggested by a law review commentary: "Breach of the implied covenant must
take into account the employee's reasonable expectations. Such expectations not only in-
clude not being fired on the basis of false charges, but also being afforded rights established
by company policies, not being terminated in violation of statutory protections and being
treated in a manner consistent with the treatment of other similarly situated individuals.
Reasonable expectations may also be based on past employer practices or predominating
industry standards. A complete listing of employer conduct which would violate the reason-
able expectation of the employee is unnecessary. It is sufficient to note that in the future
the courts should analyze all the circumstances surrounding an employment relationship in
addressing the issue of bad faith discharge." Hagerty, Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Employment Contracts: From Here to Longevity and
Beyond, 14 W. STATE U. L. REv. 445, 463 (1987).
103. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
104. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206
Cal. Rptr. 359 (1984).
105. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., supra note 87, 24 Cal. 3d 820, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (quoting Goodman & Seaton, Foreword: Ripe For Decision, Internal Workings
and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REv. 309, 346-47
(1974).
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In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the court stated
that the special relationship between the insurer and its insured
warranted the tort action and explained:
The insurers' obligations are ... rooted in their status as pur-
veyors of a vital service labeled quasi-public in nature. Suppliers
of services affected with a public interest must take the public's
interest seriously, where necessary placing it before their interest
in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements.... [A]s a sup-
plier of public service rather than a manufactured product, the
obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage. The obligations of good faith and fair dealing
encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the re-
sponsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves out as fidu-
ciaries, and with the public's trust must go private responsibility
consonant with that trust.
Furthermore, the relationship of insurer and insured is inher-
ently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance contracts
places the insurer in a superior bargaining position. The availa-
bility of punitive damages is thus compatible with recognition of
insurers' underlying public obligations and reflects an attempt to
restore balance in the contractual relationship. 0
This language establishes that the special relationship model is
essentially instrumental. The model considers the functional, so-
cial consequences of a legal rule. Not surprisingly, formally-
minded academic commentators have criticized the model on the
ground that it is a standard, not a rule.10 7
In 1984, in the Seaman's case, the California Supreme Court
declined to characterize an "ordinary commercial contract" as a
special relationship.108 The court stated:
In holding that a tort action is available for breach of the cove-
nant in an insurance contract, we have emphasized the 'special
relationship' between insurer and insured. . . . When we move
from such special relationships to consideration of the tort rem-
edy in the context of the ordinary commercial contract, we move
into largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters. Here,
parties of roughly equal bargaining power are free to shape the
contours of their agreement. . . . In such contracts, it may be
106. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 820, 157 Cal. Rptr. 487-88.
107. In an important student note, Michael Cohen criticized the model on essentially
formal grounds. Cohen, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing As a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291, 1298-1301 (1986) (the special relation-
ship model is "inadequate to define the scope and applicability of a tort duty of good faith
and fair dealing"). C. Delos Putz and Nona Klippen, in another formally-minded analysis,
argued that the special relationship is "illusory"; that it is not a "principled basis of deci-
sion"; and that "the qualifying contracts cannot be identified until the issue has been liti-
gated, which is too late." Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not
Tort Liability--Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 478-79 (1987).




California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss1/3
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE TORT LAW
difficult to distinguish between breach of the covenant and
breach of contract, and there is the risk that interjecting tort
remedies will intrude upon the expectations of the parties. This
is not to say that tort remedies have no place in such a commer-
cial context, but that it is wise to proceed with caution in deter-
mining their scope and application."9
What types of relationships, then, are special? Insurance (under
Egan) is one. Before the recent decision in Foley, it appeared that
employment might be another. In footnote 6 of its Seaman's opin-
ion, the court stated:
In Tameny. . . this court intimated that breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship
might give rise to tort remedies. That relationship has some of
the same characteristics as the relationship between insurer and
insured."x0
D. The "Special Relationship" After The Seaman's Case
Several weeks after the filing of the Seaman's decision, one
court of appeal followed the suggestion in footnote 6 and identified
employment as a special relationship (but not in the context of an
involuntary termination).111 In Wallis v. Superior Court, a former
employee entered into an agreement with his ex-employer. The
parties agreed that the employer would provide the employee with
a pension in exchange for a promise not to compete. The employer
then breached the agreement. 1 2 The Court in Wallis held that:
For purposes of serving as a predicate to tort liability, we find
that the following 'similar characteristics' must be present in a
contract: (1) the contract must be such that the parties are in
inherently unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for
entering the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to
secure peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary
contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not re-
quire the party in the superior position to account for its actions,
and (b) they do not make the inferior party 'whole'; (4) one
party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may
suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform;
109. Id.
110. Id., 36 Cal. 3d 769, n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 362 ("In Tameny ... this court inti-
mated that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment rela-
tionship might give rise to tort remedies. That relationship has some of the characteristics
as the relationship between insurer and insured. [See Louderback & Jurike, Standards for
Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 220-26)
(1981).]" The Louderback & Jurike article does not identify employment as a relationship
that "might give rise to tort remedies.")
111. Wallis v. Superior Court (Kroehler Mfg. Co.), 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 123 (1984)
112. Id. at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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and (5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability." 3
Various courts of appeal have recognized the Wallis factors as
legitimate criteria for identifying a special relationship in a con-
text other than either insurance or employment. One court held
that there is a special relationship between a bank and its deposi-
tors. 14 The general approach, however, has been for the court to
acknowledge the special relationship model, but then to hold that
the model does not apply to the particular contractual dispute the
court has been asked to decide.11
The Seaman's case encouraged wrongful discharge tort claims.
After the Seaman's decision, it was possible for an employer to
commit a Seaman's tort. More importantly, if a special relation-
ship triggered a bad faith tort action, and if employment was a
special relationship, a court could conclude that a wrongful dis-
charge was a bad faith tort.
V. THE BAD FAITH TORT IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL
In the post-Tameny, pre-Foley era, numerous courts of appeal
considered the bad faith wrongful discharge tort. The original de-
cision recognizing the tort (Cleary v. American Airlines) was con-
fusing and raised more questions than it answered. 6 After 1984,
the courts relied on the language in the Seaman's case to identify
the new bad faith tort duties of employers.
113. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The court cited no authority for the exis-
tence of this five-prong test. The analysis is similar to the four-prong test advocated in the
law review article by Louderback and Jurike, supra note 84.
114. Commercial Cotton Company, Inc. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App.
3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (refusal of bank to reimburse depositor for loss caused
by bank's negligent error.)
115. Martin v. U-Haul Company of Fresno, 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1988) (termination of contract with independent rental equipment dealer); Okun v. Mar-
tin, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1988); (exclusion of investor from business
opportunities); Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1988)
(breach of contract to provide limousine service for an evening); Multiplex Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. California Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987) (wrongful
refusal by insurance company to pay commission allegedly due to insurance agent). In a
decision which did not refer to the Wallis criteria, another court of appeal held that there
was no special relationship between two commercial enterprises, notwithstanding the fact
that the contract involved a major portion of the plaintiff's business, Quigley v. Pet Incor-
porated, 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984). See also Premier Wine &
Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 846 F.2d 547, 540 (1988) (termination of nonexclusive
wholesale distributorship agreement; the federal court stated that it did not "detect ele-
ments of public interest or fiduciary relations that would make the distributorship close to
one of employment or insurance.")
116. Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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A. The Cleary Decision
In 1981, in the Cleary case, the court of appeal stated that a
wrongful discharge in violation of the covenant gave rise to a tort
action."1 ' The court held: "The longevity of the employee's ser-
vice, together with the expressed policy of the employer, operates
as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such an em-
ployee by the employer without good cause.'l" There are, how-
ever, numerous problems with the Cleary opinion. The employee's
common law cause of action was probably preempted by federal
labor law."x9 The court misinterpreted an earlier decision. 20 Most
importantly, the court did not explain why it singled out the two
particular criteria of longevity and adherence to internal company
rules as the controlling factors.' 2'
After 1981, only one court of appeal-the court of appeal in the
Foley case-adhered strictly to the two-prong test in Cleary. 22
One other court implied that Cleary should be interpreted nar-
rowly.' 23 The majority of the appeals courts, however, followed
the proposition that "the theory of recovery articulated in Cleary
117. Id.
118. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
119. Cleary alleged that the stated reason for his dismissal was a pretext and that he
was actually dismissed for union organizing activities. The union activity of airline employ-
ees is governed by the Federal Railway Labor Act, administered by the National Media-
tion Board. 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1982). The federal statute preempts a state cause of action
for wrongful termination. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1348 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.). This observation concerning the preemption of Mr. Cleary's claim was
originally made in Brody, Wrongful Termination as Labor Law, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 434,
460, n.131 (1988).
120. Cleary v. American Airlines, supra note 10, 111 Cal. App. 3d 453, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 729, citing the following observation in Coats v. General Motors, 3 Cal. App. 2d 340,
348, 39 P.2d 838, 841: ". . . where there is evidence tending to show the discharge was
due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services, the question is one for the jury."
The Coats decision did not impose an independent duty on the employer. In Coats, the
contract provided that the employee would receive a stock bonus, unless he was dismissed
because of unsatisfactory service (of which the executive committee shall be the sole
judge). Coats v. General Motors, 3 Cal. App. 3d 340, 343, 39 P.2d 838, 840. The question
was whether the employee had performed his contractually-obliged services to the satisfac-
tion of the other party.
121. The court cited a student law review note, Implied Contracts to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974), "for analysis and criticism of the common law rule." This
article identified several criteria which tend to support implied contractual rights to job
security: special benefits to the employer, detrimental reliance by the employee, the policy
of the firm, the nature of the job, the common law of the industry, and longevity of service.
Id. at 350-65.
122. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 28, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1986) (Roth, J.).
123. Newfield v. Ins. Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 2d 440, 445-46, 203 Cal. Rptr.
9, 12 (1984) (cause of action for bad faith discharge "always predicated upon other public
policy grounds, statutory violations, an express [or clearly implied] contract ground, or
upon a combination of elements" such as "company policies, faithful service, and lack of
criticism").
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is not dependent on the particular factors considered in that
case."
124
B. The Post-Seaman's Cases
What, then, was the predominant theory of recovery? In the
pre-Foley era, there were two leading cases. In Khanna v.
Microdata, the court defined the employer's duties by adopting
the Sawyer test: in employment contracts, the covenant is
breached whenever the employer "engages in 'bad faith action' ex-
traneous to the contract, combined with the obligor's intent to
frustrate the [employee's] enjoyment of contract rights. '125 In the
other leading case, Koehrer v. Superior Court, the court built
upon the concepts developed in the Seaman's opinion. 28 The
court held there is no tort if the employer believed in good faith
that he had good reason to terminate the employee.1 2 1
Justice Kaufman, writing for the Koehrer court, interpreted the
Seaman's tort as a bad faith tort.1 28 He stated:
While the court in Seaman's stated that it was not necessary to
base its decision on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing [citation], it is difficult otherwise to understand its re-
peated reference to 'good faith' and 'bad faith'.... In any
event, its language is instructive.1 29
This observation was mistaken. The Supreme Court in the Sea-
man's case specifically emphasized that the Seaman's tort is en-
tirely independent of the bad faith tort.30
There was another difficulty with the Koehrer opinion.' 3' The
124. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860,
867 (1986). The other employment cases rejecting the narrow approach include: Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Rulon-Miller Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Crosier
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
125. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867,
quoting Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 623. In
Khanna, the employee alleged that he had been discharged in an effort to deprive him of
previously-earned sales commissions.
126. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Kauf-
man, J.).
127. Id. at 1172, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829. ("If the employer merely disputes his liabil-
ity under the contract by asserting in good faith and with probable cause that good cause
existed for discharge, the implied covenant is riot violated and' the employer is not liable in
tort.") In evaluating the employer's conduct under this test, there is a subjective element
("good faith") and an objective element ("probable cause").
128. Id. at 1172, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
129. Id.
130. Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 79, 36 Cal. 3d
at 769, 206 Cal. Rptr. 363. ("For the purposes of this case . it is not even necessary to
predicate liability on a breach of the implied covenant").
131. For a somewhat similar discussion of the point developed in this paragraph, see
[Vol. 26
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two-prong test in Seaman's is different from the two-prong test in
Koehrer. In a Seaman's tort, the defendant must first breach the
contract (the first prong) and then unreasonably deny that the
contract exists.132 In the Koehrer bad faith tort, the employer as-
serts in good faith that there is good cause to terminate (the first,
subjective prong), and must also make this assertion with probable
cause (the second, objective prong) 133 The tests in the two cases
are quite different.
The distinction is important and can'be illustrated by reference
to the facts in the Koehrer case. In Koehrer, it was unclear
whether the employer had breached the contract (the first prong
under Seaman's). The contract provided that the plaintiffs would
manage three apartment buildings for one year. The employees
were then discharged less than four months after they had begun
to render services. The employer alleged they had failed to per-
form their contractual duties. In any event, the employer never
denied that there was a contract, and so there was no violation of
the second part of the Seaman's test.3 Under the Seaman's test,
properly applied, the employee's action would not have survived a
motion for summary judgment. The Koehrer court ruled, however,
that there was a triable issue of fact, and the case presumably
went before a jury.
Why did Justice Kaufman transmute the special relationship
test (arising out of the covenant) into a Seaman's-type tort? One
can only speculate; It would seem that the formal approach to
deciding the case was not a viable alternative. The standard defi-
nition of the covenant was much too general to determine whether
an employee had been discharged wrongfully. At the same time,
the special relationship test was not desirable because it required
the court to engage in instrumental analysis. The court would
have been required to formulate an open-ended standard; to inves-
tigate complex employment markets; and to make an overt deci-
sion about a difficult question of policy. It was much easier to bor-
Bacon & Gomez, Huber Is A Ruling At Odds With Prior Decisions, Los Angeles Daily
Journal, March 18, 1988, at 4, cols. 3-6. Bacon & Gomez criticize a federal decision which
followed Khanna and Koehrer. Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 79, 36 Cal. 3d
at 769, 206 Cal. Rptr. 363. ("a party to contract may incur remedies when, in addition to
breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and
without probable cause, that the contract exists").
133. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 829. The
text is quoted in full at note 127, supra.
134. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1160-61, 226 Cal. Rptr. 822. The
contract provided that the plaintiffs would manage three apartment buildings for two years.
They were discharged less than four months after they began their employment. The em-
ployer provided them with a letter reciting their alleged deficiencies.
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row the Seaman's test.
How would the Seaman's test, properly applied, have affected
an employee, who, unlike the plaintiffs in Koehrer, served at-will,
without a fixed term of service? In an at-will contract, the em-
ployee, by definition, has no expectation of continuing in employ-
ment. Therefore, a termination cannot breach the contract.135 The
second prong of the contract is never reached; there is no analysis
of the reasonableness of the employer's conduct; and there is no
tort.
The distinction between a breach of contract and a breach of
covenant was noted by the court in Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc."'3
The Hejmadi court emphasized that a termination does not
breach an at-will contract.3 7 There is a potential tort only in lim-
ited circumstances: "Where the employment is strictly at-will,
there may exist in certain employment relationships an expecta-
tion of a contractual benefit which is independent of continuing
employment."' 38
The Hejmadi case is the converse of the earlier Cleary opinion.
The Cleary decision is instrumental. The new tort was justified
with the rationale that, because of modern economic conditions,
the at-will rule should be changed to protect employees (i.e., be-
cause of the social consequences argument). 39 Also, courts are in-
stitutionally capable of making policy. 40 Hejmadi is also an in-
strumental opinion, but with a completely different twist. Because
of the complexity of the employment markets, the consequences of
changing the at-will rule are unknown and unpredictable, and the
rule should not be changed (i.e., because of the social conse-
135. Several courts have held that there can be no breach of the covenant where
there is an express at-will term in the contract. Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Gerdlund v. Electronic
Dispensers International, 190 Cal. App. 3d 266, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1985). For a more
recent, and contrary view, see Rodie v. Max Factor Co., - Cal. App. 3d., 256 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1989). The Rodie court held that a subsequent oral promise may modify a written at-
will clause in a contract of employment.
136. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1988).
137. Id. at 546-52, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 14-20.
138. Id. 202 Cal. App. 3d 549, 249 Cal. Rptr. 19. In the at-will contract, there can
be no expectation of "continuing employment." The Hejmadi court gave an example of "a
contractual benefit which is independent of continuing employment": previously-earned
sales commissions. If an at-will employee is dismissed to deprive him of commissions, there
would be a cause of action under the Hejmadi analysis.
139. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 449, 168 Cal. Rptr. 725 ("When
viewed in the context of present-day economic reality and the joint, reasonable expectations
of employers and their employees, the 'freedom' bestowed by the rule of law on the em-
ployee may indeed be fictional").
140. Id. at 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (although the legislature has not amended the
at-will statute, "some exceptions have been made to its application in particular cases
where, for reasons of public policy-as perceived by the judiciary or the Legislature--such
exceptions have been deemed warranted") (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 265
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quences argument).' 41 The Hejmadi court also stated that the
courts are not institutionally competent to make policy.'42
C. The Need For a Supreme Court Decision
In general, however, the decisions in the courts of appeal during
the period 1981-1988 were neither instrumental nor formal. The
courts were primarily concerned with adapting the decisions of the
supreme court to the particular problem of the employer's duty to
act in good faith. The courts did not indicate that they were en-
gaged in social engineering (i.e., an instrumental approach). Nor
did the courts invoke the covenant and then blandly conclude that
the employer had (or had not) breached the duty (i.e., a formal
approach).
Why were the judges of the courts of appeal reluctant to justify
their decisions on either purely instrumental or purely formal
terms? By definition, courts of appeal are intermediate courts. In-
strumentalism was unavailable, because it would be inappropriate
for a court of appeal to appear to formulate social policy or to
perform legislative functions. Formalism was unavailable because
of the supreme court's excessively general definition of the cove-
nant. The definition of good faith was so broad that it was difficult
to determine when a particular discharge breached the
covenant.'"
Therefore, the intermediate courts attempted to ascertain the
nature of the employer's duty by referring to language in prior
California Supreme Court opinions. The Khanna definition of the
duty is quoted from Sawyer, which in turn interpreted an earlier
supreme court decision.4 The Koehrer definition drew upon the
language in the Seaman's case. 115
In the period between 1981 and 1988, almost all of the courts
of appeal recognized the new wrongful discharge tort . 46 There
141. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., supra note 136, 202 Cal. App. 3d 546, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 17. The court stated: ". . . it is essential that the heterogenous nature of employment
relationships be taken into account. The standards we create apply equally to the economi-
cally marginal employer of one or two employees as well as to the presumably profitable
major corporate enterprise." ibid.
142. Id. at 544-45, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 16 ("... it is not the prerogative of the judi-
cial branch of government, absent some compelling reason based on fundamental public
policy or statutory direction, to impose a limitation" on the right to discharge employees).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
144. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 867;
Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625; Brewer v.
Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 584, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 620 (1960).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
146. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 47 Cal. 3d 685-89, 254 Cal. Rptr. 228-31
(opinion of Lucas, C. J., reviewing cases), 47 Cal. 3d 703-05, 254 Cal. Rptr. 241-243
(opinion of Broussard, J., reviewing cases). Neither justice discussed Hejmadi v. AMFAC,
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was a marked disagreement among the courts, however, with re-
spect to the exact nature of the employer's duty under the cove-
nant. By 1986 it was clear that the new tort would have to be
reviewed by the supreme court.
VI. THE FOLEY CASE
On December 29, 1988, the California Supreme Court issued
its long-awaited decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation.
The court had granted the petition for review on January 30,
1986. Oral argument was heard on June 11, 1986, and then
reheard on April 6, 1987, after three new judges were named to
the court following the confirmation elections of November
1986.147
A. The Facts
Although the legal issues arising out of the case were complex,
the facts were relatively straightforward. 148 The Interactive Data
Corporation (IDC) hired Daniel Foley on June 17, 1976. There
was no written contract of employment and no express agreement
as to whether Foley served at-will. Thereafter, Foley regularly re-
ceived promotions and pay raises. On January 1, 1983, IDC trans-
ferred Richard Kuhne to fill a supervisory position over Foley. At
that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was investi-
gating Kuhne for suspected embezzlement from his previous em-
ployer. IDC knew about the investigation. Foley did not know,
however, that IDC was already aware of the FBI investigation.
On January 14, 1983, Foley confided to Kuhne's superior, Rich-
ard Earnest, that "he was worried about working for Kuhne, and
concerned about Kuhne having a supervisory position at IDC."
Earnest chastised Foley for raising the issue and warned him not
to discuss the matter with anyone else. It is possible that Foley
may have wanted Kuhne's job.
IDC and its supervisors then followed an inconsistent course of
action. On March 3, 1983, Kuhne told Foley that Foley was to be
demoted and transferred from California to Massachusetts. On
March 15, 1983, Foley received a merit bonus of $6,726. On
March 16, 1983, Kuhne told Foley he could continue in his cur-
Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 525, 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, which was decided after the Foley case was
re-argued.
147. The new justices were Kaufman, Arguelles, and Eagleson. Arguelles, who
joined in the majority opinion, has since retired. His seat was filled by Justice Kennard.
Justice Kennard joined the majority when it later held that Foley was fully retroactive.
148. The facts in the case are set forth at Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
at 663-64, 254 Cal. Rptr. 212-14.
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rent position if he agreed to go on a "performance plan." On
March 17, 1983, Kuhne gave Foley a choice: resignation or dis-
missal. Foley refused to resign and was dismissed by IDC. On
September 26, 1983, Kuhne subsequently pleaded guilty to em-
bezzlement from his previous employer. IDC retained Kuhne as
an employee.
B. The Proceedings Below
Foley then sued IDC. In his second amended complaint, he as-
serted three separate theories: a tort cause of action alleging a
discharge in violation of public policy; a contract cause of action
alleging breach of an implied-in-fact promise to discharge for
good cause only; and a tort cause of action alleging breach of the
implied covenant of good faith.149
The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on
all three causes, and entered judgments for the defendant. The
court of appeal affirmed.150 Justice Roth, writing for the court,
strictly interpreted the rights of employees. The public policy ex-
ception is available only when there is an express statutory viola-
tion.151 A claim for breach of an oral at-will contract is barred by
the statute of frauds.152 Finally, an employer tortiously breaches
the implied covenant only where: (1) he violates express personnel
procedures, and (2) the employee has served for a lengthy period
of time. 53
C. The Supreme Court Decision
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that "tort reme-
dies are not available for breach of the implied covenant in an
employment contract to employees who allege they have been dis-
charged in violation of the covenant."' 54 Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by three other justices
(Panelli, Arguelles, and Eagleson). 55 Justices Broussard, Kauf-
149. Id. at 662, 254 In the period between 1981 and 1988, almost all of the courts of
appeal recognized the new wrongful discharge tort. There was a marked disagreement
among the courts, however, with respect to the, exact nature of the employer's duty under
the covenant. By 1986 it was clear that the new tort would have to he reviewed by the
supreme court.
150. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 28, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1986) (Roth, J.).
151. Id., 193 Cal. App. 3d 35, 219 Cal. Rptr.
152. Id., 193 Cal. App. 3d 35-37, 219 Cal. Rptr. 870-71.
153. Id., 193 Cal. App. 3d 37, 219 Cal. Rptr. 871. The court noted there was a
different approach, in the Khanna case, and simply disagreed, without further comment.
154. Foley v. Interactive Data, 47 Cal. 3d at 700; 254 Cal. Rptr. 239.
155. Id. at 662-700, 254 Cal. Rptr. 212-40.
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man, and Mosk all filed dissenting opinions.' " 6
In addition to the tort question, the Supreme Court decided two
other issues relating to public policy and breach of contract. In
Part I of his opinion, Justice Lucas held that the employee did not
state a cause of action for violation of public policy.1 ' 7 The scope
of the court's ruling on the public policy question was limited. The
court expressly stated that it has not yet decided the question of
whether the sources of public policy are limited to statutes or con-
stitutional provisions. 58
In Part II of the majority opinion, the court disposed of two
issues arising out of the cause of action for breach of contract.
First, the court held that a contract for employment does not fall
within the Statute of Frauds: the statute did not bar Foley's law-
suit.' 5" Second, the court held that in an at-will relationship, the
employer's conduct may create an implied-in-fact contract limit-
ing his right to discharge the employee arbitrarily. The court fol-
lowed Pugh and stated that "the totality of the circumstances de-
termines the nature of the contract"; if the plaintiff can plead and
prove an implied promise not to discharge except for good cause,
he is entitled to contractual damages.6 0
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Lucas addressed the bad faith
discharge issue.1 6' Part III can be divided into three sections.
First, he reviewed and criticized the various appellate decisions
recognizing the tort action.1 62 Second, he discussed the special re-
lationship model and concluded that "the underlying problem"
was "the uncritical incorporation of the insurance model into the
156. Id. at 701-24, 254 Cal. Rptr. 240-56.
157. Id. at 665-71, 254 Cal. Rptr. 214-16.
158. Id. at 669, 254 Cal. Rptr. 217.
159. Id. at 671 675, 254 Cal. Rptr. 218-21. The Statute of Frauds provides that an
oral contract is unenforceable if it is "[a]n agreement that by its terms is not to be per-
formed within a year from the making thereof." CAL. CIv. CODE § 51624(a) (West 1985).
The court held that because "the employee can quit or the employee can discharge for
cause, even an agreement that strictly defines appropriate grounds for discharge can be
completely performed within one year or within one day, for that matter." Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d at 673, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 220. Cf. White Lightning Co. v.
Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968).
160. The evidentiary factors that may be used to prove an implied promise to dis-
charge only for cause include "the personnel polices or practices of the employer, the em-
ployee's longevity of services, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assur-
ances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is
engaged." Foley, at 680, 254 Cal. Rptr. 225. The court also suggested that an express at-
will contract can preclude proof of an implied promise: several decisions "can be inter-
preted to preclude enforcement of an implied in fact modification of an on-going employ-
ment agreement when some written provision insists on the employee's at-will status." Id.
at 680, note 12, 254 Cal. Rptr. 225.
161. Id. at 682-700, 254 Cal. Rptr. 227-40.
162. Id. at 685-89, 254 Cal. Rptr. 228-31.
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employment context."163 Third, the Chief Justice noted that there
are many different remedies which can be made available to com-
pensate wrongfully discharged employees. Lucas declared that the
selection of the appropriate remedy should be made by the Legis-
lature, not the courts.'"
Justice Broussard concurred with the majority on the public
policy and breach of contract questions, but dissented from Part
III of the opinion.16 5 He emphasized that many appellate courts
recognized the tort; stated that employment is similar to insur-
ance; and rejected Lucas' call for deference to the Legislature.
Justice Kaufman agreed with Broussard on these issues. 66 Justice
Mosk dissented, not only on the tort issue, but also from Part I of
the majority opinion. Mosk refused to narrowly define public pol-
icy. He stated that Foley's actions were "in the best interests of
society as a whole, and therefore covered by the public policy
rule. 1 67
VII. LEGAL REASONING IN FOLEY
The formal-instrumental tension divided the court in the Foley
case. Balanced pro and con arguments were used by the judges in
their conflicting opinions.1 6
A. Formalism
The spirit of formalism permeated the majority opinion. Chief
Justice Lucas stated a preference for rules, as opposed to stan-
dards, in common law. He offered a traditional justification* for
rules: predictability and certainty. 69 He believed, however, that
"it would be difficult if not impossible to formulate a rule that
would assure that only 'deserving' cases give rise to tort relief."170
The Lucas opinion is also formal in its argument that the judi-
ciary should not make public policy. Law, the majority indicated,
is separate from politics:
163. Id. at 689, 689-93, 254 Cal. Rptr. 231-34.
164. Id. at 693-700, 254 Cal. Rptr. 240-50.
165. Id. at 701-15, 254 Cal. Rptr. 240-50.
166. Id. at 715-23, 254 Cal. Rptr. 250-56.
167. Id. at 723-24, 254 Cal. Rptr. 256.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
169. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal. 3d at 696, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236. ("Pre-
dictability of the consequences of actions related to employment contracts is important to
commercial stability.") In a footnote to this observation, the court stated that "the gener-
ally predictable and circumscribed damages available for breach of contract reflect the
importance of this value in the commercial context." Id. at 696, n.33, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
236.
170. Id. at 697, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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Significant policy judgments affecting social policies and com-
mercial relationships are implicated in the resolution of this
question in the employment termination context. Such a deter-
mination ... arguably is better suited to legislative
decisionmaking 171
Lucas, however, did not write a purely formal opinion, because
he could not ignore the exception that had been carved out for
insurers. Insurance is a special relationship, because of the imbal-
ance in bargaining power between the insurer and the insured. 2
Bad faith misconduct by insurers is tortious. Therefore, Lucas was
compelled to address the question of whether employment could
be analogized to insurance. This question, in turn, invited an in-
strumental analysis of the functional purposes which would be
served by modifying the legal rule.
Lucas' treatment of this issue is an intriguing variation on for-
malism. A purely formal opinion would simply cite precedent,
limit the exception to insurance on grounds of stare decisis, and
avoid any consideration of the social effects of the at-will rule.
Instead of resting on precedent, however, Lucas essentially relied
on a theoretical model drawn from neoclassical economics. An ec-
onomically rational employer will fire an employee only if that
employee's marginal contributions exceed his marginal costs. If an
employee is dismissed, he can go into the market and find another
position. Lucas stated:
[A]s a general rule, it is to the employer's benefit to retain good
employees. The interests of employer and employee are most
frequently in alignment . . . in terms of abstract relationships,
as contrasted with abstract insurance relationships, there is less
inherent relevant tension between the interests of employers and
employees than exists between that of insurers and insureds.173
Instead of an abstract, general legal rule, the court invoked an
abstract, general economic model. The court then assumed, as any
strict formalist would, that the general model inevitably generated
a particular conclusion. Profit-maximizing employers will not fire
employees for irrational (unfair) motives; therefore, tort remedies
are not required to protect workers.
There are, of course, several criticisms that can be offered
171. Id. at 694, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235. In a footnote, the court added that legisla-
tures "have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold
hearings at which all interested parties may present evidence and express their views Id. at
694, n.31, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
172. "[W]hen an insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim or to accept a policy
offer within settlement limits ... the insured cannot turn to the marketplace to find an-
other insurance company willing to pay for the loss already incurred." Id. at 692, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 234.
173. Id. at 693, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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against this argument: not all employers act rationally and not all
employees can readily find jobs elsewhere. This is not to suggest
that Lucas' opinion, on this point, is "wrong." What the opinion
does suggest is that, on this issue, the court essentially relied on a
typically formal method of reasoning. The general rule (or model)
was the significant consideration, not the social outcome
B. Instrumentalism
By contrast, the arguments in the dissenting opinions illustrate
the spirit of instrumentalism. Justice Broussard's opinion indicates
that he is comfortable with standards. He noted that a "suitable
test" is that "an employer acts in bad faith in discharging an em-
ployee if and only if he does not believe he has a legal right to
discharge an employee." 17 4 In a footnote, Broussard intimated
that "reasonableness" is also an appropriate standard: "The con-
cept of reasonableness, like that of bad faith, is one familiar to
tort law, and not generally considered so unpredictable or subjec-
tive as to justify denial of relief." 7'
Justices Broussard and Kaufman were also instrumental in that
they refused to treat employees as faceless, impersonal abstrac-
tions. They both emphasized the social importance of protecting
vulnerable workers. 17 6 Broussard stated: "Employment is even
more important to the community than insurance; most people
value their jobs more than insurance policies."177 Kaufman made
the point even more forcefully.178
It is not self-evident, however, that the new tort, if recognized,
would have protected economically vulnerable employees. The ef-
fect of an economic intervention is difficult to calculate in ad-
vance.1 9 The poor are left unprotected because wrongful dis-
174. Id. at 711, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
175. Id. at 711, n.10, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
176. Id. at 707-10, 718-19, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 244-46, 252-53.
177. Id. at 708, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
178. Id. at 718-19, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
179. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. RaV. 1816, 1829 (1980). The author observes:
The liberal rationale for judicial intervention-that inequalities of bargaining
power must be recognized and corrected-is problematic. First, this theory fails to
explain why an employee in a strong bargaining position, such as a highly skilled
person recruited by a marginal firm in need of her skills, may not bargain for job
security. Second, even when the parties are clearly not equal bargainers, judicial
intervention at best only partially redresses the imbalance. Increased liability for
wrongful discharge will generally raise the costs of hiring and firing. By altering
only one term-termination rights-among a range of possible terms, which in-
clude wage rates, working conditions, and fringe benefits, the court leaves the em-
ployer free to shift the cost of the new protection. In most cases employees will
eventually wind up 'paying' at least part of the new term's cost.
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charge actions are normally filed only by middle and upper class
managers. 1 0 Finally, the recognition of the tort might have had
the paradoxical effect of partially defeating its stated purpose.
Some commentators have argued that the wrongful discharge tort
undermines labor unions.181 Unions protect economically vulnera-
ble employees, but the remedies for unjustly terminated union
members are limited to reinstatement and back pay. The availa-
bility of the tort affords unorganized employees greater relief than
their unionized counterparts. Therefore, it can be argued, the tort
hurts rather than helps employees. In summary, it is not clear that
a change in the legal rule would achieve the optimal economic
outcome.
Justice Kaufman also stated that the courts possess the institu-
tional competence to choose among competing social and eco-
nomic policies. This, of course, is a key tenet of instrumentalism.
He criticized "judicial abstention" and wrote:
The imposition of a tort duty is not contingent upon a consensus
of so-called experts. The courts are the custodians of the com-
mon law-not the economists, or the legislators, or even the law
professors. We abdicate that duty when we abjure decision of
common law questions under the guise of 'deference' to the po-
litical branches.
182
Significantly, Kaufman quoted with approval the work of two
great judicial critics of formalism: Benjamin Cardozo and Roger
Traynor. 83 The legal historian Lawrence Friedman has written of
these judges:
The realists had no great reverence for legal tradition as such.
Realist judges and writers were openly instrumental; they asked:
what use is this doctrine or rule? A string of citations was defi-
nitely not a sufficient answer; it was no answer to invoke noble
judges from the past, or to appeal to so-and-so's treatise, or to
deduce a result logically from principles expressed in prior cases.
There was less and less tolerance of artifice, fictions, real and
apparent irrationalities. Law had to be a working social tool.18'
Friedmajn believes that instrumentalism is now the dominant
180. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge; The Public
Policy Exception, supra note 57, at 1937-47 (1983); Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, supra note 3, 130-35.
181. Brody, Wrongful Termination As Labor Law, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 434, 465-71
(1988). Brody asserts: "More effectively than any goon squad, it could bust unions." Id. at
471.
182. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d at 721, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
183. Id. at 719-22, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253-56, quoting, inter alia, B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCaSS (1921); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893,
40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964) (Traynor, J.); Muskoph v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (Traynor, J.).
184. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d. Ed. 1985).
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model of reasoning, at least among "an important elite" of judges
and lawyers.'81 But formalism, as Foley demonstrates, is by no
means dead.
C. Was Foley Correctly Decided?
It is true that formalism and instrumentalism generate matched
sets of stereotyped, recurring arguments. In some instances, how-
ever, one argument or the other will be more appropriate to the
particular issues presented by a case. In Foley, the controlling,
and best, argument was the institutional competence argument
advanced by Chief Justice Lucas. If the tort had been recognized,
the court would have rewritten the law of employment in
California.
In Foley, the California Supreme Court faced a difficult social
and economic problem. Thousands of middle-aged, middle-level
managers have been laid off by their employers as a consequence
of the restructuring of corporate America in the 1980s."'8 The in-
terests of employers must be balanced against the interests of
these displaced executives.
The social problem is enormous and complex. It does not, how-
ever, involve the constitutionally protected rights of the interested
parties. Since the constitutional revolution of the late 1930's, and
the celebrated Footnote Four in the Carolene Products decision,
courts have been willing to protect fundamental constitutional
rights, just as they have been reluctant to overturn social and eco-
nomic legislation.18 7
Legal rules determine economic outcomes. The new bad faith
tort would have triggered a revolution in the employment market
if it had been recognized by the supreme court. Every termination
would have been a potential tort case. The creation of a new cause
of action would have been an exercise in judicial legislation. It
would not have been an incremental expansion within the settled
principles of the common law. Such policy making, as Chief Jus-
185. Id. at 688-89.
186. Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div., 638 F. Supp. 726, 735 (C.C.D. Cal. 1986) ("A
major social problem of this decade is what to do about the large numbers of executives
and high-level employees, now in their fifties and older, who 'paid their dues, by working
their way up corporate ladders which can no longer support their collective weight. . . the
cases are arising at a time when whole generations of corporate learning are being rendered
irrelevant by foreign competition and changes in technology .... 19)
187. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95, 69 S. Ct. 448, 458 (1949) (Frank-
furter, Jr., concurring) ("... those liberties of the individual which history has attested as
the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements"); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152, n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783.
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tice Lucas rightly emphasized, is a matter best left to the
legislature.
Lucas' opinion cannot be seen as a reactionary victory for em-
ployers and the status quo. The legislature can repeal Foley and
allow tort actions, if it so chooses. If it does not act, the people
themselves can bypass the normal channels of government and en-
act legislation through the initiative process.188 For now, remedies
are available within the framework of the long-established rules of
contract law. The Foley decision made it clear that a discharged
employee is free to plead breach of an implied oral contract. One
appellate decision filed since the Foley decision has even recog-
nized an implied oral promise as superseding at-will clauses in
written contracts.18 9 Compensatory damages are still available
where an employer has breached an implied contract.190
CONCLUSION
In this decade, the California Supreme Court has twice consid-
ered the availability of tort actions to protect employees. In
Tameny, the court, by a 5-2 vote, recognized a wrongful discharge
tort in an instrumental opinion which provoked formal dissents.
During the succeeding eight years, there was an almost complete
turnover of the personnel on the court. In Foley, the court, by a 4-
3 vote, declined to recognize a second wrongful discharge tort in a
formal opinion which triggered instrumental dissents.
There are now eleven other wrongful discharge tort cases pend-
ing before the court.1 91 It can be expected that the arguments as-
sociated with formalism and instrumentalism will reappear when
the court decides those cases.
188. CAL. CONST. art. IV (power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments
to the constitution, and to adopt or reject them).
189. Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., - Cal. App. 3d., 256 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989).
190. Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the Sea-
man's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEWS, 1, 14 (1984) ("contract damages can be "amplified" because
juries can be encouraged as well as guided in bad faith cases to award a higher rather than
a lower compensatory award with the leeways and the range of uncertainty that presently
exist in the law of contract damages").
191. See cases cited at supra note 16, and accompanying text.
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